HILLSBOROUGH

Epilogue 25.4.13
Lord Justice Goldring today announced that the Hillsborough fresh inquests will take place early in 2014. Finally justice is edging a little bit closer for the families of the 96 who died. There is a division between the families as to where the inquests should be held. A very difficult initial decision for the judge, but I know that he is a very good man who will do his best. Now is not the time for division.

Below is my piece about what happened according to the Independent Hillsborough Report.

Today 19th December 2012 the Attorney General will apply to the High Court to quash the original Inquest Verdicts in the cases of the Hillsborough 96. This is what the case is all about. A new inquest, years too late, is nonetheless an important step forward in the painful fight for true justice for those who lost their lives and for their families.
Fight For Justice
23 years ago 96 Liverpool football fans went to a football match. They did not return. Unbelievably their families have had to fight tirelessly to uncover the truth behind the events of that day.
I salute the tenacity of ordinary, but valiant and heroic parents and family members.
What is often forgotten is that many others were involved that day. They were either directly caught up in the horror, or witnesses to the unimaginable. Their lives were changed forever. A dear friend's brother's future was shattered that day.
On the 12th September 2012 the Independent Hillsborough Report was published. In stunning clarity, and following the most unbelievably thorough consideration of documents, it lays out the truth about the events of that day and the surrounding circumstances. The Panel has done the most splendid job. Its members have begun to right a wrong in our society.
These are my thoughts on some aspects of the report. I am still reading it and may be for some time to come.

Before.

I find it almost impossible to grasp that there were well documented problems with serious congestion and crushing injuries to fans at the Leppings Lane end of Hillsborough in 1981 before the semi final between Wolves and Spurs. An exit gate had to be opened to relieve the crush. Fans escaped onto the pitch through the small gates. At that time there were no 'pens' so sideways movement and dispersal was possible. Nonetheless the maximum capacity of the Terrace was significantly exceeded. South Yorkshire Police (SYP), though, did restrict access to the central tunnel. The Panel took note of documents from the period which showed that in 1981 crowd safety was 'compromised at every level' and the many deficiencies were well known.
In the aftermath SYP and SWFC argued about their responsibilities. Wednesday and their safety engineers resisted repeated SYP calls to reduce the capacity of the terrace. The pens were created in 1981 on the recommendation of SYP. Lateral movement was only possible thereafter via a small inadequate gate.
SWFC is severely criticised in the Report. SWFC's primary consideration was cost. Their own safety consultants had, to some extent, similar motivations.
Reports commissioned by the club show that the ground had failed to meet minimum standards under the Safety of Grounds Act 1975 since 1978. Additionally such inspections as there were by those charged locally with safety issues, were 'inadequate and poorly recorded'.
Hillsborough was extensively modified between 1981 and 1987. There were now 2 central pens accessed by the central tunnel under the West Stand. No revised safety certificate was ever issued and, illustratively, recommendations to feed fans to designated pens via specific turnstiles were rejected by SWFC on the grounds of cost. Consequently no statistical information was generated at the turnstiles as to the crowd distribution between pens to enable safe monitoring of numbers.
The Fire service had raised concerns about emergency evacuation provision. The only exit gates to the pitch perimeter were well below recommended standards.
The documentation suggests that SYP were preoccupied with crowd management issues, segregation of fans and prevention of disorder.  SWFC were motivated by limiting costs.
Key safety issues were not discussed at annual safety inspections.
Hillsborough was not used for semi finals thereafter until 1987, then 1988 and of course 1989.
Incredibly there were further issues of overcrowding at both the 1987 and 1988 events. The club denied at the time that there were any crowd related incidents on either occasion.
There was crushing at the 1988 semi final. The central gate to the Leppings Lane Terrace was closed to prevent further access to the central pens. Neither of these events was recorded in the SYP debriefing notes for that semi final and neither were the methods used to combat them. The closing of the central gate as a means of controlling access to the central pens at the 1989 event was not included in the SYP Operational Order.

15th April 1989.

This was a disaster waiting to happen.
The lessons of previous years had not been truthfully and faithfully documented, had been disregarded, or were simply blatantly ignored for reasons of cost and operational focus.
The stadium was a potential death trap and this was, or should have been, known.
The Police operation was focussed upon issues relating to crowd disorder, ticketless fans and in particular Liverpool fans. They were stigmatised by the Police whose mindset prioritised crowd control over safety, a standpoint that was particularly directed at Liverpool fans.
SYP replaced Chief Supt Brian Mole, its experienced Hillsborough Match Commander a month before the semi final. There is no explanation in the extensive documentation as to why he should be replaced by David Duckenfield at that sensitive time. Duckenfield had minimal experience of Hillsborough policing.
Both attended the planning meeting ahead of the event, but the Fire and Ambulance services did not. There is no explanation for this in the documentation.
The disaster was not the fault of the Liverpool fans. They had been allocated areas of the ground which constituted a documented 'bottle neck' and this presented in the words of the Panel 'a predictable and foreseeable risk of crushing injury'. The crush was not due to late arrivals or 'drunken fans', but to the inadequacy of the turnstiles to process the crowd safely.
The Panel ascribed the causes of the disaster to:
flaws in responding to the emerging crisis rooted in institutional tensions between organisations

policing and stewarding policy focussed on crowd disorder

failure to realise consequences of opening the exit gates to relieve congestion

failure to control and monitor allocation between the pens and failing to seal the central tunnel (as had been done successfully the previous year)

delay in realising that the nature of the crisis did not relate to disorder.

To their immense discredit, SYP Senior officers later denied knowledge of the 1988 tunnel closures. Subsequent to the tragedy officers on the ground made statements stating that their senior officers had ordered them to close the tunnel the previous year. Those officers were put under pressure and asked to amend their statements by the Force solicitors. Those officers who referred the 1988 'crushings' were asked to change their statements. To lie.

The only people that emerge with credit from this appalling disaster are the fans, the people who rushed to the aid of the stricken, and later the families, dignified but determined, and those who assisted them on the long journey towards the truth, including this Panel. It is a cliche, but they ultimately did not 'Walk Alone'.

Now 12.10.12
Justice for the 96 moved a step closer today when the Independent Police Complaints Commission announced a wide ranging enquiry, as a direct result of the Independent Hillsborough Panel Report, into the actions of Police officers on the fatefulday, during the various investigations which followed and in their alleged attempts to hide or distort the truth. There are many uncomfortable questions. Those officers who failed the families and society cannot be allowed to slink away into early retirement without final accountability where justified.